KEY POINTS

• The International Atomic Energy Agency says it cannot confirm that Iran has diverted none of its nuclear material covered by international safeguards.
• Inspections at sites hit by Israeli and joint Israeli-US military strikes have not resumed, while access to other safeguarded facilities also remains restricted.
• The agency is seeking to verify Iran’s declared stockpile of 440 kilogrammes of highly enriched uranium.
• IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi says diplomatic engagement and independent inspections are essential to preventing nuclear proliferation.

MAIN STORY

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) says it cannot confirm that Iran has diverted none of its nuclear material covered by international safeguards, as restrictions on inspections continue more than a year after military strikes disrupted its monitoring activities.

IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi told the United Nations Security Council on Tuesday that the situation could and must be resolved through constructive engagement with Iran.

Grossi said agency inspectors had been unable to return to nuclear sites damaged by Israeli airstrikes in June 2025 and joint Israeli and US attacks in early 2026. The agency had also seen no evidence that repair or rebuilding work had taken place at the damaged locations.

He said satellite monitoring could not replace physical access to the facilities, leaving the agency unable to complete the verification work required under its safeguards arrangements.

The Bushehr nuclear power plant is the exception, with inspectors currently working there. According to Grossi, Iran’s atomic energy agency has cooperated in providing the equipment needed to verify spent nuclear fuel before it is transferred to dry storage, a process expected to take place early next year.

However, normal inspections have not resumed. Iran has yet to provide the information and access the IAEA needs to verify previously declared nuclear material at safeguarded facilities.

The restrictions extend beyond sites damaged in the attacks to include facilities that were not targeted.

Grossi expressed particular concern over Iran’s declared stockpile of 440 kilogrammes of highly enriched uranium, which remains a key focus of the agency’s verification efforts.

The IAEA is also seeking access to the Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant, which Iran declared shortly before the June 2025 strikes.

Grossi stressed that diplomatic engagement, supported by independent verification, remained essential to preventing nuclear proliferation.

THE ISSUES

The central issue is the IAEA’s ability to account for nuclear material that Iran has declared to the agency. Without the necessary information and physical access, inspectors cannot confirm whether the material remains where it was reported to be or establish that none has been diverted.

The distinction is important: the agency’s inability to verify Iran’s nuclear material does not, by itself, prove that diversion has occurred. It means the agency cannot provide the required assurance based on its available inspections and evidence.

The declared stockpile of 440 kilogrammes of highly enriched uranium is a particular concern because verifying its location and status is central to the agency’s monitoring work. The supplied report does not establish that the stockpile has been diverted or explain its current physical location.

The situation also demonstrates the limits of satellite monitoring. Images may help inspectors observe changes at nuclear facilities, but they cannot fully replace on-site access and the inspection procedures needed to account for nuclear material.

WHAT’S BEING SAID

• “Only diplomacy, underpinned by IAEA verification, can prevent nuclear proliferation in the long term.” – Rafael Grossi, IAEA director-general.

WHAT’S NEXT

Grossi has called for constructive engagement with Iran to restore the information-sharing and access needed for inspections.

The IAEA will need to resume normal verification activities at the affected facilities and obtain access to the Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant to address the outstanding questions. The supplied report does not indicate when Iran will provide the required access or when inspections at the other sites will resume.

Inspectors are expected to verify spent nuclear fuel at Bushehr before its planned transfer to dry storage early next year.

BOTTOM LINE

The IAEA has not confirmed that Iran has diverted its safeguarded nuclear material, but it also cannot provide assurance that none has been diverted while access and inspections remain restricted. Restoring independent verification is central to resolving the uncertainty and addressing concerns over nuclear proliferation.

Source: NAN