This article was written by Dr Fatai Alli, a retired Major General of the Nigerian Army and former Chief of Training and Operations
Nigeria has lived under civilian rule since 1999, its longest uninterrupted stretch of constitutional government. But longevity is not the same as consolidation. The more demanding question is quieter: what kind of civilian rule is this? Is democratic control of the armed forces becoming routine—anchored in institutions, rules, and predictable oversight—or is it still managed through personalities, bargains, and improvised deals?
Nigeria’s civil–military relations sit within a political settlement in which informal bargains often outrun formal rules. Civilian supremacy can be real in law yet thin in practice: the military remains politically subordinate, but the boundaries of authority are repeatedly renegotiated.
Three episodes reported between November 2025, and January 2026 sharpen this picture: the confrontation involving the FCT Minister and a naval officer over disputed land; the controversy over a planned “special” promotion for the President’s Aide-de-Camp (ADC); and the decision to try officers accused of involvement in coup plotting. Each episode is distinct, yet all point to the same institutional question: how power is exercised, and how rules are made credible.
Abuja land dispute: authority tested by procedure
The Abuja land dispute became a national flashpoint because it unfolded as a public contest over the meaning of authority. In the This Day Newspaper account, the Minister of State for Defence, Bello Matawalle, presented the naval officer as dutiful—acting on instruction—while suggesting that the FCT Minister disregarded cautionary advice associated with senior service leadership. The FCT Minister, however, maintained that his actions were proper and within his lawful responsibilities.
Whatever the legal merits of the land claim, the larger significance lies in what the episode reveals about institutional restraint. In a consolidated democracy, disputes that touch the armed forces are channelled through predictable procedures—chain-of-command communication, legal clarity, and disciplined de-escalation. Nigeria has rules that point in this direction; the recurring weakness is that rules can become negotiable when status and access are at stake.
The episode exposes two competing logics of civilian control: rule-bound direction through professional channels, and personalised assertion that expects institutions to adjust after the fact. When the second logic dominates, civilian control becomes less about governance and more about rapid, situational assertion of authority outside established procedures. It also risks drawing the uniformed services into reputational and political crossfire even when officers are simply following instructions, reinforcing the perception that influence, not procedure, settles disputes.
ADC promotion episode: merit, morale and the politics of exception
In mid-December 2025, reports indicated that President Tinubu had approved—or was poised to approve—an extraordinary promotion for his ADC, Colonel Nurudeen Yusuf, to brigadier-general shortly after his elevation to colonel, before the plan was reportedly shelved following objections and interventions by respected retired senior officers.
Promotions are a core mechanism through which professionalism is sustained. Where progression is predictable and standards are credible, cohesion is reinforced. Where progression appears discretionary—linked to proximity rather than performance—confidence in the chain of command weakens and morale takes a hit.
Had the promotion proceeded, the most serious damage would likely have been quiet but deep: it would have told the officer corps that access can outrank merit. Perceived unfairness becomes disengagement and a gradual tilt from competence to patronage as the safest career strategy—an erosion that can turn a single professional force into competing informal networks long before any crisis becomes visible.
The reported reversal is instructive because it suggests an institutional boundary being asserted. Pushback—whether from serving circles, retired senior figures, or both—reflects concern that personalised exceptions can corrode the promotion system that underpins professionalism and internal trust. The effect is to reinforce rule-based progression and limit the drift from lawful civilian authority into personalised discretion.
Coup-plot trials: discipline, legitimacy and internal confidence
In late January 2026, Nigeria’s Defence Headquarters announced that officers detained over misconduct allegations would face trial, with some accused of plotting to overthrow the government.
A measured approach is essential. Allegations are not convictions, and the armed forces have a duty to investigate misconduct and pursue due process. Yet the announcement carries analytical weight because it points to something deeper than a single case: civilian rule can endure while strains accumulate inside the security architecture—especially where institutions are still competing with influence.
In a rule-bound system, discipline rests not only on punishment, but on confidence that careers, postings, and command authority follow intelligible standards. When that confidence weakens—through persistent perceptions of favouritism, politicised advancement, or unequal accountability—the institution becomes more vulnerable to rumour and factional interpretation, and grievance becomes easier to mobilise.
Seen in that light, coup allegations function as a stress signal whether or not they are ultimately proven. They point to internal conditions that can make indiscipline thinkable: contested legitimacy, perceived unfairness, and uncertainty about whether the institution is anchored primarily in constitutional professionalism or increasingly shaped by patronage and factional expectations. If career governance and promotion credibility drift toward discretion, cohesion is weakened from within, with costs for effectiveness and stability.
From Episodes to Institutions
Read together, these episodes suggest a familiar pattern in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: the military is largely subordinate to civilian rule, yet democratic control remains only partly institutionalised. The underlying issue is the credibility of rules, and the reliability of the procedures that translate civilian authority into legitimate command.
The work of consolidation is therefore less about grand assertions of supremacy and more about routine governance: transparent promotion pathways, credible civilian defence management and oversight, and a clearer separation between procedure and proximity. In Nigeria’s current democratic phase, the more salient tension is less between ballots and barracks than between institutions and informal influence. The long-term stability of civilian rule will depend, in significant measure, on whether predictable, rules-based control becomes the organising principle, with informal influence operating as an exception rather than the norm.
Dr Fatai Alli is a retired Major General of the Nigerian Army and former Chief of Training and Operations. He holds a PhD in Area Studies from the University of Portsmouth, United Kingdom.
